The Contents of the «Far Eastern Studies» N4, 2026.
Contents
From the Editors
Politics
Asmolov K.V. The results of the Presidential elections in South Korea and the first steps of President Lee Jae-myung
Gabrielian M.O. China as a XXI Century Maritime Power: Conceptual and practical aspects
Zabella A.A. China’s Approaches to Reforming the Global Governance System
Zakharova M.S. Development of integration projects of South Korea in Central Asia: achievements and prospects
Katkova E.Yu. China-Fiji Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative
Economics
Biryukova O.V., Barzunov D.A., Pautov A.V. Financing of the Belt and Road and North—South Projects: a Comparative Analysis
Gorbunova M.L., Komarov I.D. China’s Strategic Resource Potential in the Sectors of the New Economy and the Respective Provision Factors
Semina L.I. The healthcare economy of the Republic of Korea: a historical overview
Sushchenko М.A. Sanctioned Piloting (Shidian) in China’s Agricultural Policy: Adaptive Governance in a Centralized System
State and Society
Guleva M.A. Population Aging in China: New Opportunities for Economic Transformation and Social Development
Zavyalova O.I. The Fate of Chinese Dialects and Language Legislation in the PRC
History
Sang Tianzi. Mission and Challenges: Soviet Advisors in China (1923–1927)
Streltsov D.V. Ichiro Hatoyama: the Japanese Prime Minister who restored relations with the USSR (on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956)
The results of the Presidential elections in South Korea and the first steps of President Lee Jae-myung
Konstantin V. Asmolov
On June 3rd, 2025, Lee Jae-Myung, a member of the Democratic Party who has been positioning himself as a left-wing nationalist and populist throughout his political career, was elected President of the Republic of Korea. This article focuses on his accomplishments during the first six months of his tenure, as well as how the situation may develop in the future.
Although Lee came into office following the impeachment of his predecessor, Yoon Seok-Yeol, whose attempt at imposing martial law was perceived by society as a coup d’état and a step toward dictatorship, there was only an 8 % difference between the two candidates. Lee’s past as a controversial politician had an impact, and much of the public’s vote was not for him personally, but rather for ending the political crisis. The conservative victory would led to a renewed round of conflict between parliament and the presidency.
Given these concerns and relying on a majority in Parliament, which allows a majority of laws to be passed without consideration for the opinion of opposition, President Lee has undertaken a series of domestic political measures aimed at strengthening the vertical structure of power. These include a special investigation into the predecessor’s actions, a witch hunt in government institutions, restructuring of the judicial and investigative systems, laws against fake news, and specific personnel appointments — all of which are elements of an offensive strategy against political opponents.
At the same time, in terms of foreign policy, President Lee Jae-myung has begun to pursue an unconventional course for a democrat, one that is more similar to that of his conservative predecessors. This includes strengthening cooperation with the United States, Japan, and the European Union, rejecting a multi-vector approach, and advocating for denuclearization as a way to end dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite some steps taken to reduce tensions. Relations with Russia have also been put on hold.
Although the previous constitutional crisis has been resolved, the conditions for a new crisis remain. This is due to a combination of factors, including elements of the political culture that the government wishes to maintain, as well as President Lee’s desire to consolidate his power, which could lead to overconfidence. Additionally, significant setbacks in the economy or foreign affairs could spark public discontent and revive the position of conservative forces. In this context, it is concerning that the authorities seek to dominate the judiciary, which may spark a new round of conflict.
China as a XXI Century Maritime Power: Conceptual and practical aspects
Maksim O. Gabrielian
Over the past 30 years, China has qualitatively changed its role in the presence in the world’s oceans. It has become a source of discussion about the fundamentals of Beijing’s maritime strategy. Analysts from the United States consider China to be a purely naval power that has successfully borrowed the concepts of American classical geopolitics. At the same time, Chinese experts refute this thesis and arguing that China has developed a multifaceted non-Western approach covering various fields of activity in the oceans. Within the framework of this work, an attempt is being made to define the Chinese concept of a «strong maritime power». The theoretical framework is based on the approach of critical geopolitics, which allows us to consider three aspects: geographical and historical conditions for the maritime buildup; expert discussion and official documents; practical measures, primarily in the field of military construction. The author comes to the conclusion that the Chinese concept of a «strong maritime power» has a dual character. On the one hand, it aims to revise the existing order at sea and seeks to achieve parity with the United States. On the other hand, Beijing is trying to peacefully integrate into the existing maritime order, positioning itself as a new guarantor, especially for the countries of the Global South. Therefore, officially, China is developing non-military ways to advance its interests at sea, including legal, economic, humanitarian and diplomatic tools. This ambivalence stems from the recognition by experts on maritime power and the political leadership of the unfortunate geographical position of the state, as well as the desire to take into account the experience of the rise and fall of past rising powers, which is officially reflected in China’s strategic documents.
China’s Approaches to Reforming the Global Governance System
Anastasia A. Zabella
This article analyzes China’s vision for the transformation of the global governance system. The author argues that the existing system faces unprecedented challenges related not only to a growing legitimacy crisis and failures in the management of global public goods, but also to the growing potential for conflict, leading to a destabilization of international relations. The study is conducted within a constructivist framework, as it allows us to understand why China is promoting the concept of a «Community of Shared Future for Humanity» (CSFH), as well as the theory of complex interdependence, which shows how China is using the Belt and Road Initiative as a tool of influence, as well as new instruments such as BRICS, to gradually transform the system. In the first part of the article, the author analyzes the crisis of global governance as a driver of the emergence of alternative models. The author, drawing on traditional understandings of governance forms («hierarchy, market, and network»), analyzes global governance and concludes that China is a proponent of implementing governance based on the «network» model. The second part of the study examines the influence of traditional Chinese concepts and socialism on China’s foreign policy. The third section of the work examines the Community of Shared Future for Humanity as the conceptual core of key narratives of global governance with Chinese characteristics, as well as the Belt and Road Initiative. The final section analyzes both existing common challenges and potential convergence points, as well as the persistent contradictions between China and the BRICS countries in matters of global governance reform, as well as possible scenarios for its development.
Development of integration projects of South Korea in Central Asia: achievements and prospects
Maria S. Zakharova
The article analyzes the key stages of development, achievements and challenges of the integration projects of the Republic of Korea in Central Asia from the early 2000s to the present, and also considers the prospects for the Central Asian direction in the foreign policy of the ROK under the new leadership. The author identifies the main reasons for South Korea’s interest in developing relations with the Central Asian countries, including an urgent need to diversify economic relations, primarily in the field of energy resources, the need to expand its technologies and investments to new markets, as well as the desire to realize its ambitions as a «middle power» in a region where collide the interests of the largest geopolitical players — Russia, China and the US. The article analyzes Korean initiatives for Central Asia: the 2005 Central Asia Cooperation Initiative of Roh Moo Hyun, the 2009 New Asia Initiative of Lee Myung Bak, the 2013 Eurasia Initiative of Park Geun Hye, the 2017 New Northern Policy of Moon Jae In, and the 2024 Korean Silk Road (K-Silk Road) of Yoon Suk Yeol. Having considered the approaches of different South Korean administrations, the author concludes that the Central Asian direction has remained relevant since its appearance on the foreign policy agenda of the ROK. Thus, in addition to traditional areas of cooperation, including investment, technology and energy, the countries are showing interest in joint projects in the field of green energy, high technology and transport. In conclusion, the author gives a positive assessment of the prospects for the development of relations between South Korea and the Central Asian countries, arguing that deepening ties with the region corresponds to the foreign policy strategy of the new president and geopolitical realities in general.
China-Fiji Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative
Evgeniya Yu. Katkova
The active promotion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Oceania is opening up new opportunities and simultaneously posing geopolitical challenges for countries in the region. Fiji’s high vulnerability to natural disasters, dependence on tourism, and shortage of skilled labor create an objective need to attract foreign investment to implement national development plans. To comprehensively analyze China-Fiji cooperation, this paper uses a structured approach, dividing the article into key sections. The first section describes the political stages of cooperation, from F. Mbainimarama’s “Look North” policy to S. Rabuka’s “Ocean of Peace” concept. This allows us to trace the transformation of Suva’s foreign policy from a partnership with China to a more pragmatic and balanced “hedging” between Beijing and Western countries. The second section is devoted to the practical implementation of the BRI in Fiji, examining in detail projects by Chinese state-owned corporations (CRFG, CR5, and Yanjian Group) to modernize transport, social, and tourism infrastructure. The third section examines new promising areas and risks in bilateral relations. It is established that at the political level, a key factor is Fiji’s desire to diversify defense ties while maintaining its partnership with China. Infrastructure development is seeing a shift from targeted projects to large-scale financing of rural areas and the implementation of «green technologies.» Among promising development areas, the main drivers are strengthening food security through agricultural technologies and Fiji’s digital transformation, leveraging Chinese experience. The article emphasizes that despite Western discourse about the risks of a “debt trap,” China remains an indispensable economic partner for Fiji. A pragmatic approach will allow Suva to minimize the risks of dependence and maximize the socioeconomic benefits of the BRI.
Financing of the Belt and Road and North—South Projects: a Comparative Analysis
Olga V. Biryukova
Dmitrii A. Barzunov
Akim V. Pautov
The formation of new transcontinental transport arteries intensifies geoeconomic competition in Eurasia and requires the development of sustainable models of investment cooperation. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and the International North—South Transport Corridor represent distinct institutional concepts for infrastructure financing, differing in their sources of capital, degree of centralization, and mechanisms of risk allocation. The purpose of the article is to compare the financing models of the two projects, to assess their complementarity or competition for investment resources and transit flows, and to identify how specific capital-attraction mechanisms influence the sustainability and dynamics of transport corridor development. The study is based on systemic and comparative approaches, institutional and case-study analysis, as well as elements of content analysis. It is shown that the Belt and Road Initiative is implemented primarily through a centralized model dominated by Chinese state-owned banks, the Silk Road Fund, and other China-backed institutions, which ensures large-scale and rapid financing but is accompanied by rising debt risks for recipient countries. In contrast, the International North—South Transport Corridor develops according to a decentralized model based on national budgets and the limited participation of regional development banks, which increases project flexibility but slows the implementation of individual segments and heightens dependence on sanctions-related and institutional constraints. A significant overlap in the membership of the two initiatives is identified, creating a space for potential cooperation and competition. The article concludes that hybrid co-financing mechanisms and enhanced institutional coordination are necessary to strengthen the resilience of Eurasian transport corridors.
China’s Strategic Resource Potential in the Sectors of the New Economy and the Respective Provision Factors
Maria L. Gorbunova
Igor D. Komarov
China’s success in the new economy is linked to the multipolar world order formation. Study focuses on assessment China’s resource capacity in new sectors alongside its geopolitical rivalries — the US and EU and concludes the following. First, only China among powers possesses strategic resources in the equipment, electronics, and environmental goods, affecting other countries’ modernization in the digital and “green” sphere. This allows the Global South representatives to overcome the Western hegemony in addressing development challenges. Second, the calculations revealed a growing resource deficit in the US across all the significant modernization vectors, and a EU and Japan resource deficit in electronics supplies, showing vulnerability in digital sovereignty. Third, China currently is a net importer in supplying new economy with microchips and rare earth metals (REMs), but the scale of production and consumption allows it to control their global markets, determining the global development dynamics within the new technological paradigm. Deficit in microchips is declining due to import substitution programs, while REM purchases are increasing. China’s trade deficit in REM is covered by ASEAN countries, indicating the formation of a technological network of friendly states involved in new economic sectors. Fourth, China’s reduced dependence on microchip supplies has had little impact on supply volumes for Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, demonstrating the sustainability of the technological and economic interconnectedness of East Asian countries.
China’s comprehensive power, comparable to Western leaders, and its influence on future development trends makes it a leading great power in the multipolar world order.
The Healthcare Economy of The Republic of Korea: a Historical Overview
Lada I. Semina
The purpose of this article is to trace the history of the formation of the healthcare system of the Republic of Korea, to note its features, to analyze the causes and results of previous reforms. The author comes to the conclusion that the system was formed reactively and progressively, following economic development of the country, responding to current pressing challenges. However, it is virtually impossible to separate the effects of reforms from the impact of the country’s growing prosperity. Economic growth has a positive impact on increasing life expectancy and reducing mortality, and also provides a source of additional investment in the system and its development, including technical equipment. The Republic of Korea has a national universal health insurance system, ensuring equal access to healthcare services for all population. Payment for healthcare services is based on a co-payment principle: insurance covers only a portion, while the patient pays the rest out of his pocket. Costs are determined by government agencies, although over 90 % of clinics are private but participate in the national insurance program. Universal health insurance is additionally financed from a special fund generated by additional taxes from the sale of cigarettes, which negatively impact citizens’ health. This, on the one hand, encourages people to quit bad habits and, on the other, replenishes the budget. The country developed a unique system that combines elements of a free market and state regulation. Thanks to this approach, free competition between clinics improved quality and equipment, while price controls ensured that medical services remained affordable for the population. Tax incentives for clinics allowed them to expand their technical capabilities, invest in development, and increase employee salaries. However, it was precisely this contradiction that led to the current crisis, forcing doctors to change specialties, following the laws of the market, and move to areas outside of strict state regulation.
Sanctioned Piloting (Shidian) in China’s Agricultural Policy: Adaptive Governance in a Centralized System
Maxim A. Sushchenko
The author examines the institution of sanctioned piloting (shidian) as a mechanism of adaptive state governance in the PRC and analyzes its interaction with the cadre evaluation system (kaohe), which transforms the right to experiment into career and financial incentives for regional authorities and performance assessment. The study aims to reconstruct the causal mechanism linking shidian, kaohe, and the outcomes of high-quality development using the case of the agricultural sector in Eastern China. The methodological framework consists of a synthesis of rational choice institutionalism, deontic rule analysis, and process tracing. The empirical basis includes regulatory documents of Zhejiang province, statistical data on the digitalization of the agricultural sector, and academic works on the transformation of the cadre evaluation system. Through the shidian institution, the PRC authorities legitimize regional deviations from standard regulations and create conditions for local innovations. An analysis of Zhejiang’s regulatory acts from 1996 to 2025 shows that path dependence ensures the stability of the shidian-kaohe interaction. The study identifies key systemic dilemmas: between efficiency and social costs, between intensification incentives and environmental costs, and between the standardization of pilot project selection and innovative potential. A spatial correlation is demonstrated between the concentration of pilot zones and the location of 33 out of 59 «100-billion-yuan counties» in eastern provinces. The results can be applied to policy analysis in other sectors and regions of the PRC, as well as to comparative studies of the adaptive capabilities of centralized systems.
Population Aging in China: New Opportunities for Economic Transformation and Social Development
Maria A. Guleva
This article examines the processes of population aging in China and their implications for the country’s economic and social development. Departing from the conventional approach that frames aging predominantly as a source of risks, this study interprets the demographic shift as a catalyst for structural transformation. By the end of 2024, China entered the phase of deep aging, with 15.6 % of its population aged 65 and above (220.23 million people). The country faces a shrinking working-age population, growing pressure on the pension system, and widening urban‑rural disparities. However, these very challenges create strong incentives for transitioning to a new growth model based on labor productivity enhancement, human capital development, and technological innovation. The article explores five key areas where aging unlocks new opportunities: labor market transformation through upskilling and re‑engagement of older workers; the development of the “silver economy” as a driver of consumer demand in segments such as fashion, health foods, education, tourism, and financial services; the application of artificial intelligence technologies to compensate for labor shortages and improve the quality of social services; the restructuring of the social security system through multi‑tiered pension mechanisms and the advancement of geriatric care; and social innovations in rural areas aimed at overcoming isolation and creating new care models. Drawing on international comparisons and statistical data analysis, the article concludes that successful adaptation to aging will enable China to shift from a growth model reliant on quantitative labor inputs to sustainable development grounded in human capital quality, technological leadership, and innovative social policy.
The Fate of Chinese Dialects and Language Legislation in the PRC
Olga I. Zavyalova
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the preservation of Chinese dialects as the carriers of the precious regional cultures has gained popularity both in unofficial and official spheres in China. The new life of dialects began on the Internet. Dialect speech is already recognized and, to some extent, generated by the large language models developed by Chinese companies. On the one hand, small dialect varieties are disappearing, and the number of speakers of major dialects among young people in megacities is declining. On the other hand, problems with understanding Standard Mandarin still remains among rural residents in various regions. The first major public discussion on the fate of dialects and the spheres of their use took place in Chinese society in 2005, following the official bans on releasing in dialects dubbed foreign, as well as domestic Chinese films and TV series. The second discussion started from 2024 in connection with the debates over the amendments and with the adoption at the end of 2025 of a new version of the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language of the People’s Republic of China. Prominent linguists not only emphasized the value of dialects as the carriers of regional cultures, a key component of self-identification, and an important symbol of one’s native place, but also called for the development of a separate law on the status of dialects. Dialect-related problems were discussed in the media and even raised by several deputies during the “Two Sessions” of the CPPCC and the NPC in 2025 and 2026. The deputies, however, did not propose any radical changes to language legislation comparable to those recently implemented in Taiwan, where major local dialects were declared national languages.
Mission and Challenges: Soviet Advisors in China (1923–1927)
Sang Tianzi
Soviet advisors working in China between 1923 and 1927 have traditionally been an important subject of research in modern Chinese history and the history of Sino-Russian relations. However, existing studies have primarily focused on the macro level, examining issues of policy, military affairs, and diplomacy within the context of Sino-Soviet relations, as well as the interactions between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In contrast, this study adopts a microhistorical approach to analyze the daily lives of Soviet advisors stationed in China. Drawing on materials from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), personal memoirs of Soviet advisors and Chinese military commanders, and contemporary periodical publications, the research identifies five major structural conflicts faced by the Soviet advisors: the ambiguity of their status; management difficulties arising from delayed communication with Moscow and internal power struggles within the group; the contradiction between internationalist ideals and Soviet state interests in task implementation; linguistic and cultural barriers in practical work; and the presence of skeptical attitudes among Chinese military commanders during collaboration. This complex set of issues contributed to a persistent sense of identity anxiety and the disruption of planned operations among the Soviet advisors, which adversely affected the implementation of Moscow’s policies and ultimately influenced the cessation of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party in the final phase of the Great Revolution.
Ichiro Hatoyama: the Japanese Prime Minister who restored relations with the USSR (on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956)
Dmitry V. Streltsov
The article traces the political biography of Ichiro Hatoyama (1883–1959) who served as Prime Minister of Japan from 1954 to 1956. The author demonstrates that Hatoyama achieved significant positions in the country’s political establishment at a relatively young age, becoming one of the leaders of the Seiyukai Party. Hatoyama adopted an anti-militarist stance after 1940, when he engaged in open conflict with the existing government, particularly the Tojo Cabinet. However, after the war he became the target of purges by the American occupation authorities who accused him of collaborating with the militarists during his tenure as Minister of Education in the early 1930s. He was banned from political activities for five years.
The article focuses on Hatoyama’s tenure as Prime Minister and his personal efforts to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, a key objective of his political agenda. The signing of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration in 1956 and Japan’s accession to the UN in December 1956 deserve recognition for the significant personal risks Hatoyama took to achieve these goals.
The author analyzes Hatoyama’s political views and concludes that he was a leader of a nationalist faction within the country’s leadership who advocated a more independent foreign and military security policy compared to the policies pursued by the Yoshida cabinets. Hatoyama did not support the restoration of a militarily powerful state. Instead, he sought to ensure that Japan had the necessary military capabilities for self-defense and to maintain international peace and security as a member of the international community.