Far Eastern Studies N5, 2022

A new issue of the «Far Eastern Studies» N5, 2022 has been released [e-version].

Contents

Politics

Asmolov K.V., Zakharova L.V. Juche Style Fight with Coronavirus: Model 2022

Song Zhihao. “To Tell about China”

Ye Yanxia. “Policy of the Great Power” of Japan under Shinzo Abe

Economics

Egorov N.Ye. The Relationship between Innovative Development and the Quality of Life of the Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region and the Subjects of the Far East

Polyanskaya N.M., Kolesnyak A.A. On Some Results of the Food Strategy of Russia, China and Japan

Shishikin V.G. Royal Dutch Shell activity in China in the 1950s–1990s

State and Society

Starshinov A.S. Segyehwa and Ideological Shifts in the Republic of Korea (1993–1998)

Russian Far East

Batomunkuev V.S., Zangeeva N.R., Ayusheeva V.G. Geodemographic aspects of the analysis of Development in the Asian regions of Russia

Military Build-up

Kamennov P.B. Civil-Military Integration (CMI) in the PRC at the Present Stage: Achievements and Problems

History

Sotnikova I.N. VKP(b) and the Political Situation in China after the Dissolution of the Comintern

Nazementseva E.N. “Fall” of Imperial and “Rise” of Soviet Policy in Xinjiang Province: Diplomats of the Former Russian Empire and “Soviet Consuls” in 1917–1920

Aurilene Е, Tuzhilun S.V. “The Liberation of Russia Will Come After the Liberation of Asia”. Russian Emigrants in Manchuquo in 1941–1945

Lebedev V.V. The Land Reform of 1946 in North Korea and the Soviet Military Administration

Book Review

Portyakov V.Ya. Book Review: A.S. Selishchev, N.A. Selishchev. China’s Economy: A Textbook. Moscow: KNORUS, 2021. 406 p.

Troshchinskiy P.V. Book Review: Budgetary Systems of Russia and China: Issues of Legal Regulation / A.A. Trofimov. Moscow: Infra-M, 2022. 215 p. ISBN 978–5–16–017244–6

Scholar Jubilee

Anniversary of Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador Andrei Ivanovich Denisov


Juche Style Fight with Coronavirus: Model 2022

Konstantin V. Asmolov
Liudmila V. Zakharova

When the pandemic began, many opponents of North Korea argued that the country’s leadership would not cope with a possible outbreak of a highly contagious infection, the consequences of which could lead to a collapse of the existing system of power in the DPRK. However, the North Koreans managed to hold out for more than two years preventing the first more lethal strains of coronavirus from spreading massively in the country. The first outbreak of COVID-19 in the DPRK was officially acknowledged in May 2022, and on August 10, a nationwide victory was already proclaimed. Foreign forecasts about the «imminent collapse of the regime» did not come true once again.

The first part of the article discusses the strategy of the DPRK to prevent the entry of the virus from abroad since 2020. Having assessed the strengths and weaknesses of their country, the leadership made a rational choice in favor of maximum isolation of the population from external contacts, observing strict anti-epidemic measures, studying the specifics of a new infection and the experience of other countries in combating it, as well as waiting for the pandemic to subside.

The second part examines the measures taken by the authorities to combat the first COVID-19 outbreak in the country in 2022. The country’s leadership adequately assessed the scale of the threat and formed a strategy based on the specifics of the administrative and healthcare systems rationally distributing limited forces and resources. Open informing the population about the dynamics of the fight against the disease, as well as the personal participation of the top leader in anti-epidemic activities, demonstrated to the masses that the state did not abandon them. At the same time, the victory was not accompanied by a “collapse of the economy” or an excessive burden on the healthcare system. All this confirms the stability of the existing management system in the DPRK and its ability to provide effective responses to new challenges.

“To Tell about China”

Song Zhihao

China has gotten much more involved in debating and solving international concerns in recent years. This is the concept behind China’s new foreign policy line, Diplomatic Activism. President Xi Jinping’s speech on “unprecedented changes not seen in hundreds of years” poses new and pressing questions for Chinese diplomats, politicians, and academics to consider, such as “What role should China play in the world?” and “How can we effectively solve the current complex international issues?” As a result, the Chinese leadership has called for “telling China’s stories well” with other countries in order to assume the role of a big power and offer their thoughts and potential answers to this tough situation.

The article considers a number of issues related to the concept of “Telling China’s stories well”, ranging from the inability of Western theories and Chinese tradition to correctly interpret China’s actions at this stage to the need to develop and systematize the Chinese experience based on Chinese historical experience, cultural and philosophical heritage, as well as the demands of the times, and so on. The “Four matters of confidence”, in particular, is examined as an important component of the “China’s stories”.

The author came to a conclusion that the notion of “Telling China’s stories” is a historical occurrence, because the Chinese had previously learnt to do so in antiquity in order to guarantee their dominance over the surrounding vassal states. And, with the assistance of Edgar Snow, and others, the CCP effectively informed the world about communist actions in the new history of China. Today, the new China is actively “talking about its stories” in order to promote and contribute to the creation of a new world order based on cohabitation, mutual benefit etc., rather than Western-centrism.

“Policy of the Great Power” of Japan under Shinzo Abe

Ye Yanxia

The article examines the “policy of a Great power” during the reign of Shinzo Abe: the emergence, main directions and factors influencing its development. The analysis of S. Abe’s attempts to get rid of the “post-war system” in domestic politics is given: to revise the pacifist constitution, to carry out vigorous military development and to restructure the national security system. Special attention is paid to the main directions of S. Abe’s foreign policy: value diplomacy, global diplomacy and foreign policy towards the United States and China. After the defeat in World War II, Japan quickly turned into a great economic power, but there were no corresponding changes in its political and military status. The Japanese Government seeks to change this situation and turn Japan into a world power with the appropriate economic and military power. The article presents the results of the “Great Power policy” during the reign of S. Abe at home and in the international arena, and also analyzes the factors that influenced its implementation. The author comes to the conclusion that the great-power policy of S. Abe has achieved certain results both within the country and in the international arena. At the same time, it was not possible to revise Article 9 of the Constitution, achieve independence in conducting foreign policy from the United States and effectively restrain China in the region and in the international arena. The strong positions of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan within the country and the stability of its foreign policy settings give reason to believe that the “Great Power policy” will be continued by the new Prime Minister.

The Relationship between Innovative Development and the Quality of Life of the Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region and the Subjects of the Far East

Nikolay Ye. Egorov

The subject of the study is the socio-economic system «innovation activity—the quality of life of the population». The purpose of the work is to determine the degree of interrelation of innovative development and the standard of living of the population in the regions. The research is based on the application of standard methods of data collection and processing, correlation analysis and rating assessment. The official data of statistical collections, foreign and domestic sources of ratings on the global innovation Index (GII), the Human Development Index (HDI), the Quality of life index (QLI) and the value of the Russian Regional Innovation Index (RRII) were used as an information base. Comparative analyses and assessments were carried out for the regions of the Far East and neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR). According to the GII-2021 rating, the APR countries are among the top 15, Russia ranks 45th out of 132 countries, and according to the HDI-2019: Hong Kong is among the top five, the rest of the countries are ranked 11th, Russia occupies 52 position. Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territory, the Republic of Buryatia occupy the leading positions according to the RRII rating. On the basis of the author’s econometric model “Triple Helix”, the shares of the actors’ contribution to the overall innovative development of the regions of the Far East are determined. It is shown that the three leaders (Sakhalin Region, Khabarovsk and Kamchatka Territory) QLI values than in Russia as a whole, and six regions of the Far East are characterized by an average level of quality of life of the population. The results of the study of the relationship between innovative development and quality of life confirm the existence of a certain correlation between the indicators of RRI/QLI and GII/HDI, which allows us to use standard regression formulas for modeling predictive estimates of the impact of innovative development on improving the level and quality of life of the population in the regions. The results of the work can be useful to the executive bodies of the state authorities of the regions for strategic planning and management of the development of the innovative economy and civil society of the macroregions.

On Some Results of the Food Strategy of Russia, China and Japan

Natalya M. Polyanskaya
Antonina A. Kolesnyak

The article presents a comparative macroeconomic analysis of the results of agricultural policy in the field of food security in Russia, China and Japan. Russia is significantly more provided with agricultural land — a factor of basic importance in food production than its eastern neighbors — China and Japan. In terms of gross agricultural production, China is the leader, especially in cereals and legumes, fruits, berries, citrus fruits and grapes, vegetables and melons, as well as eggs. For these products, China has full self-sufficiency, but at the same time it lacks its own production for potatoes, meat and milk. Japan is not provided with its own fruits, berries, citrus fruits and grapes, vegetables and melons, as well as meat and milk. Russia also lacks its own production of these products, with the exception of meat, with which it is fully provided. The average Russian citizen does not fully consume vegetables and melons, as well as milk and dairy products, for which there is a low level of self-sufficiency and economic accessibility in the country. The food strategies of the studied states testify to the importance of food supply in the system of national security and improving the quality of life of the population, combining their interests in organizing large agricultural organizations, state support for the development of agriculture with its full financial support, the formation of an economically sound agricultural policy for the development of agriculture as the basis of social stability, equating its products with the most important strategic resources.

Royal Dutch Shell Activity in China in the 1950s–1990s

Vitalii G. Shishikin

At the turn of the 19th and 20th century Chinese market was attractive to Western merchants. The Anglo-Dutch company Royal Dutch Shell used demand from local consumers to sell fuel and test development mechanisms under permanent political instability and economic turbulence. The practices gained over the previous years helped the company quickly restore work in the region after the end of the Second World War and integrate into the economic system of Hong Kong which was undergoing major changes in the 1950s—1980s. Forced out of China, Royal Dutch Shell had become one of the key players in the fuel market of the British colony, using it as a platform for improving the mechanisms of business in a period of dynamic economic development and a solid foundation for working in the Asian region. At the turn of the 1970s—1980s the Anglo-Dutch group began to restore its positions in the PRC which were lost in the middle of the XX century by consistently gaining a foothold in the promising market that had a serious resource base and increased demand for products of fuel and energy complex. The conditions created by the Chinese authorities allowed Royal Dutch Shell to establish and develop multichannel cooperation with local companies in exploration and production, transportation and storage, as well as processing and sale of fuel resources. The Chinese side acted as a recipient of technology, management practices and investments provided by Royal Dutch Shell. The variety of joint projects and the diverse nature of the interaction between Royal Dutch Shell and Chinese companies in the last third of the XX century became the basis for the bilateral economic relations development at the beginning of the XXI century.

Segyehwa and Ideological Shifts in the Republic of Korea (1993–1998)

Alexander S. Starshinov

The article examines ideological shifts in the Republic of Korea during the presidency of Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) under the framework of his policy of “globalization”, segyehwa. The purpose of this study is to analyze the long-term transformations of South Korean political discourse that occurred in the 1990s and continue to influence the ideology of the Republic of Korea now. The article identifies two key areas of segyehwa’s ideological influence.

On the one hand, segyehwa was a discourse aimed at political mobilization that emphasized catching-up with the “international standards” by constantly increasing competitiveness in all spheres of life, and thus this ideology became a continuation of the mobilization and modernization discourse of the era of military dictatorship, albeit adapted to the new realities of the international economy. In case of the hujinguk-seonjinguk dichotomy, segyehwa partially transferred the political language of the authoritarian Republic of Korea to the democratic one, expanding it to all spheres of life, and it continues to exist in this form to this day.

On the other hand, segyehwa had a strong influence on the perception of Korean identity, culture, and history. Against the background of a reshaped historical narrative that included anti-Japanese sentiment and democratization at the state level, Korean identity was reconsidered, and became global. Moreover, Korean culture was supposed to become not only a unifying factor for such identity, but an effective export industry that would attract people and actively participate in international competition, which later became the basis for South Korean “soft power”.

Geodemographic Aspects of the Analysis of Development in the Asian Regions of Russia

Valentin S. Batomunkuev
Natalya R. Zangeeva
Valentina G. Ayusheeva

Demographic processes are key links in matters of spatial development. The study of these processes, their dynamics, tendencies and factors is necessary for the formation of an integral spatial picture. The relevance of this study is associated with the growing role of demographic processes in the spatial development of the region. In this aspect, the regions of the Asian part of Russia are strategically important for consideration. Geographically, in terms of area, Asian Russia is the largest macro-region of our country (77 % of the territory). In terms of population size and density, it is in many ways inferior to its European part (25 % of the total population). Uneven distribution, underpopulation, depopulation and migration are key problems in the spatial development of the region. The article presents an analysis of the main geodemographic parameters: age structure and level of urbanization on the example of the regions of the Asian part of Russia for 2010-2019. The age structure of the population is one of the key categories in demographic studies. On the one hand, it serves as a basic tool for studying the labor potential of any socio-economic object, and on the other hand, it has a direct impact on the process of population reproduction. For spatio-temporal display of the transformation of the age structure, the method of triple coding was applied. This method is based on the triangular Pere diagram, where demographic parameters are synthesized and have their own color code. To analyze the level of urbanization, the index method of E.A. Efimova, which allows to differentiate the structure of population settlement. The results obtained clearly reflect the inter-regional inequality and polarization of the socio-economic space of the Asian part of Russia.

Civil-Military Integration (CMI) in the PRC at the Present Stage: Achievements and Problems

Pavel B. Kamennov

The development of the process of Civil-Military integration (CMI) in the PRC, which in recent years has adopted the scale of a national strategy and aimed at creating an effective innovative system of science, technology and production in the country, combining military and civilian resources, in order to increase the capabilities of the military-industrial complex for the production of weapons and military equipment of a new generation for modernization of the PLA and at the same time — facilitating the transition of China’s economic system to world-class high-tech production to ensure the country’s international competitiveness in a new era. The goal of civil-military integration is to create a unified civil-military system and a unified strategic potential of China, in order to plan the development of the military and civil spheres on this basis with the rational use of resources. The estimates of Chinese analysts are given, who believe that the CMI should cover China’s top-level national strategies (the «Going Out» strategy, the «One Belt, One Road» initiative, innovation-based development, strategies for achieving the status of a world power in critical areas: advanced high-tech manufacturing, space, the world ocean, artificial intelligence) and at the regional level (development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei zone, the Yangtze River Economic Belt, the West, the Northeast renewal strategy). The article analyzes the successes in the implementation of the CMI at the present stage, the problems on the way to its deepening and measures to resolve them. In the author’s field of view is the efforts made in recent years in China to extend the strategy of the CMI to foreign economic activity and international scientific and technical cooperation.

The VKP(b) and the Political Situation in China after the Dissolution of the Comintern

Irina N. Sotnikova

The article is devoted to the influence of the dissolution of the Comintern on the events in China, as well as to the activities of the Department of International Information (DII) formed instead of the Comintern under the Central Committee of the VKP(b).

The self-dissolution of the Comintern was positively received by both political forces in China — the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang. This decision of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International) allowed Mao Zedong to secure a leading position in the party and isolate the Comintern in the Politburo from the CPC Central Committee.

Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of the disappearance of the «International Communist Headquarters» to discredit the CPC as a «foreign product» hostile to China.

However, quite quickly, China found itself on the brink of civil war, threatening the collapse of the anti-Japanese national united front. Only the position of the USSR, the USA and the democratic forces in China did not allow Chiang Kai-shek to start a punitive campaign against the Special Region of China and the Communist Party. For more than two years, relations between the two parties remained extremely tense. G. Dimitrov, the actual head of the DII, had neither the authority nor the opportunity to somehow influence the political events in the neighboring country. The functions of his department were reduced mainly to the collection of information. Moreover, the main role in obtaining information was played by representatives of the Soviet special services located at the headquarters of the Central Committee of the CPC in Yan’an, as well as in Chongqing, the country’s temporary capital, where the negotiations between the CPC and the Kuomintang took place. The defeat of Japan and the end of World War II changed the form and the possibilities of relations between the VKP(b) and the CPC.

“Fall” of Imperial and “Rise” of Soviet Policy in Xinjiang Province: Diplomats of the Former Russian Empire and “Soviet Consuls” in 1917–1920

Elena N. Nazementseva

The article reveals the peculiarities of diplomatic relations between Russia and China in East Turkestan (Xinjiang) in 1917–1920. After the collapse of the Russian Empire and the outbreak of the Civil War in Russia, diplomats representing the interests of the former Russian state remained in their posts and continued to perform their duties. So did the Russian consuls in the Chinese province of Xinjiang — A.A. Dyakov, V.V. Dolbezhev, V.F. Luba, A.I. Uspensky. After the October revolution of 1917 the leadership of Soviet Russia sent its representatives to China, demanding the resignation of the consuls of the former Russian Empire. The Chinese authorities at the official level did not recognize the government of Soviet Russia and refused to establish relations with the representatives who arrived, at the same time allowing the leadership of the border provinces of China, in particular, Xinjiang province, to carry out informal contacts with them. The representatives of Soviet Russia who arrived in Xinjiang demanded not only the termination of the powers of the former tsarist consuls, but also their extradition, but were refused. The instability of the situation in Russia and the threat of the introduction of Red Army units into the territory of the province forced its authorities to continue contacts with Soviet representatives, while maintaining relations with former consuls. The events on the fronts of the Civil War led to the fact that the authorities of Xinjiang finally refocused on establishing relations with representatives of Soviet Russia, and the former tsarist consuls, except A.A. Dyakov, left Xinjiang, and then China.

“The Liberation of Russia Will Come After the Liberation of Asia”. Russian Emigrants in Manchuquo in 1941–1945.

Elena E. Aurilene
Svyatoslav V. Tuzhilun

The article examines the situation of Russian emigration in the puppet state of Man-zhou-digo in the conditions of the war for «Great East Asia». Based on the unique archives of the Bureau for Russian Emigrants in the Manchurian Empire (BRAM), documents of the Tokyo process, Russian-language publications, sources of personal origin, the attempts of the Japanese command to use the patriotic sentiments of the «white Russians» to turn them into loyal subjects of the puppet empire and allies in the struggle for supremacy in the Eastern Asia. To this end, under the control of the Japanese military missions, systematic ideological and political work was launched aimed at bringing the values of the Japanese great-power policy into the consciousness of the emigrant population. Propaganda of the Japanese ideology and way of life went through the school, socio-political organizations, BRAM structures, periodicals, mass political actions, the inclusion of emigrants in the system of providing for the needs of the belligerent Japanese army. Ideological and political propaganda was reinforced by police control in wartime mode and open falsification of events on the Soviet-German front. The attack of Hitler’s Germany on the Soviet Union had a wide resonance in the emigrant environment, causing a rapid growth of defensive sentiments. For the majority of the Russian population, patriotic feeling turned out to be stronger than political propaganda and fear of reprisals carried out by the military-police regime. Many emigrants, including employees of law enforcement and other official institutions, began working for Soviet intelligence. For this reason, in 1945, the Japanese authorities did not dare to use Russian military units trained to fight the Red Army.

The Land Reform of 1946 in North Korea and the Soviet Military Administration

Vasilii V. Lebedev

The land reform of 1946 in North Korea became one of the most important events in the history of the country immediately after the liberation. Despite active resistance and vicious class struggle, the North Korean land reform was conducted quite rapidly. It also opened the way for the nationalisation of industry and the slow transition to socialism. It also had a great impact on South Korea, creating enormous pressure on the US military administration and the South Korean political elites. The road to the land reform, however, was far from straight and simple.

Drawing from the Soviet and North Korean documents this article examines its historical background as well as the main factors that influenced the decision of the Soviet military command to conduct the reform, mostly focusing on the demands of North Korean communists and peasants, as well as Soviet necessity procure food supplies.

This article also examines different projects of the land reform, starting from the early «bourgeois-democratic» one and ending with the final radical project. One of the main reasons why the Soviets decided to go with the latter project can be found in the specific vision the Soviet military command had concerning its tasks in North Korea. The downfall of the moderate and right-wing politicians from the top leadership of North Korea during the Moscow decision crisis left the Soviet military command with no other allies apart from communists. This left the radical land reform the only possible solution that could fit the goals of the Soviet military.